introduced a set of privacy requirements for algorithms that solve search problems. In this paper, we consider the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem as a private search problem, where the task is to find a string of (or embedding corresponding to) an LCS. We show that deterministic selection strategies do not meet the privacy guarantees considered for private search problems and, in fact, may "leak" an amount of information proportional to the entire input.
INTRODUCTION
The sensitivity of patient data stored in large genomic databases makes their widespread use in research problematic. Working with this data while protecting a patient's privacy is recognized as a major challenge for the biomedical research community [8, 39, 42] . Rigorous definitions for privacy in this area, however, are still in development. In this paper, we investigate a problem of significant importance Copyright 2009 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of the U.S. Government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only. to genomic computation: the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem. We propose that the privacy notions from private search give a type of functional security, offering a strong definition for patient privacy while allowing specific questions posed by researchers to be answered. We show that these privacy notions can be realized for the LCS problem, efficiently and with perfect privacy.
To date, research in secure genomic computation has considered variants of the string alignment and LCS problems where the desired output is the edit-distance or the length of a subsequence [9, 21, 30, 41] . The alignment or subsequence itself, however, is often of equal or greater interest to genomic research. In these scenarios, the problem is no longer a function, for example there may be many longest common subsequences for any pair of strings (in fact, the number of solutions may be exponential in the length of the input). To remedy this, we must first fix some strategy to select an output. There is a growing body of literature -securely solving distributed constraint satisfaction problems [33, 36, 37, 45] , combinatorial auction optimization [40, 44] , selecting a stable bipartite matching [20] , selecting an optimal k-means clustering [17] , generating small decision trees [31] -where the selection strategy chosen is arbitrary, heuristic, or simply the one terminating earliest. However, the choice of output may serve as a kind of "covert channel" that leaks information about the inputs (unwittingly or maliciously). For tasks in genomic computation, this can mean an accidental compromise of patient privacy.
We design algorithms to perform this selection for the LCS problem, provably meeting the security definitions introduced for private search. This is not always possible. Firstly, private search algorithms are unlikely to exist for many problems, including approximations of 3SAT [11] , kmeans clustering and vertex cover [12] . Secondly, there are problems for which finding a solution is easy yet uniformly sampling a solution seems hard, e.g. stable bipartite matching [15] . Lastly, it is not always possible to re-use private search algorithms for related problems because the reduction typically distorts the solution space. The private search algorithm for shortest path [13] , for example, cannot be used for LCS because all known reductions from LCS to shortest path have the property that multiple paths correspond to the same subsequence; thus, a random path does not correspond to a random subsequence.
We define and investigate privacy structures for two important variants of the LCS problem. For the first, a solution is some longest common subsequence string. For the latter, a solution is some "embedding," i.e. structural data show-ing how the subsequence was encoded in the original input. While these two variants are used interchangeably in the LCS literature and are often computed using the same set of techniques, we demonstrate that they have very different privacy requirements. We provide output sampling algorithms and equivalence protecting algorithms for both these variants. Additionally, we design private search algorithms for selecting a word in the language of some deterministic finite automaton, which may be of use in private search beyond our specific application (searching lexicons, searching a trie of game-playing strategies, pattern-recognition, etc).
Our main contribution is to design private search algorithms which are efficient. Towards this goal, we provide an efficient, generic technique to convert a dynamic programming algorithm into an output sampling algorithm. Unlike constructions from previous work, which perform a weighted selection by repeatedly counting the solution space, we use the dynamic programming paradigm to count the solution spaces of all possible sub-problems at the same cost of counting solutions to the original instance (and avoid counting repeatedly). We also describe and use an efficient reduction from the LCS string problem to the problem of words in the language of a DFA, where the reduction has the important property of preserving the structure of the original solution space (sometimes referred to as a parsimonious reduction).
In contrast, the literature on private search algorithms [11, 12] is overwhelmingly concerned with the existence or nonexistence of polynomial-time algorithms for various problems, and less concerned with the efficiency of those algorithms. Our work can be seen as the beginning of a line of research on the efficiency of private search, and a new line of research for the literature on LCS efficiency.
Motivation.
Performing different computational tasks on large biological databases is becoming a more common practice in both public and private institutions. The FBI maintains a database of over four million DNA profiles of criminal offenders, crime scene evidence, and missing persons in its CODIS system [3] , and uses the data for forensic studies and DNAbased identification. The United Kingdom's UK Biobank [7] and Quebec's CARTaGENE [2] projects each plan to collect genetic samples from 1 percent of their respective populations. deCODE Genetics [4], a biopharmaceutical company which studies genomic data for drug discovery and development, has collected the genotypic and medical data of over 50 percent of the population in Iceland. Similar endeavors seek to make these types of databases available for scientific study [6] .
The genomic data stored in these databases may be extremely sensitive: an individual's DNA sequence reveals a great deal of information regarding that individual's health, background, and physical appearance [1, 5] . It has been shown that a sequence can be linked to the corresponding individual simply by recognizing the presence of certain markers [32] . In the United States, HIPAA's Privacy Rule [34] mandates that a patient's identity must be protected when their data (including genomic data) is shared; failure to assure this may result in legal action, fines, revocation of government funding, and imprisonment. The privacy notions considered in this paper may help establish the groundwork for investigators, clinical researchers, and institutional review boards when designing projects, defining rules for disclosure, and obtaining informed consent from participants.
PRELIMINARIES
Let A and B be two strings over a finite alphabet Σ of size σ, with lengths m = |A| and n = |B| (without loss of generality, let m ≤ n). A longest common subsequence (LCS) of A and B is a subsequence of both A and B such that no other common subsequence has greater length. To help us formally define those variants of the LCS problem that have received attention in the literature, we introduce the following notation.
For any ∈ Z + , let the value function v : Σ ×{0, 1} → Σ * be defined such that for all
Definition 1 (LCS Embeddings). Let the relation
If LCSe(A, B, α, β) is true, we call (α, β) an embedding of an LCS of A and B. An embedding is essentially a witness that v(A, α) is a valid subsequence of A. In some situations, however, we are only interested in the subsequence itself.
Definition 2 (LCS String). Let the relation LCS(A, B, x) be true if there exists some
Algorithms in the literature that solve the longest common subsequence problem return one or more of the following outputs: (i) the length |x|, where LCS(A, B, x); (ii) a string x, where LCS(A, B, x); (iii) an embedding (α, β) of an LCS, where LCSe(A, B, α, β). The literature has typically not differentiated strongly between algorithms which recover strings and those which recover embeddings, but we will show later that these problems have different security requirements.
The following dynamic programming algorithm solving the longest common subsequence problem was independently discovered by many researchers (in both computer science and biology). Let L be the (m + 1) × (n + 1) matrix whose entries can be computed (row-by-row or column-by-column) using the following:
Entry L [m, n] holds the length of the LCS for A and B. When we consider the variant of the LCS problem which outputs only the length of the LCS, then the LCS problem is a function. However, when we consider the variants which output embeddings or strings (or both), then the problem is no longer a function and we must consider how to perform the selection. When selecting an LCS embedding, for example, the number of possible solutions is bounded by the following.
Claim 1 (Bound on Number of Embeddings [25] Note that because each string must have an embedding, E(n, m) also provides an upper bound on the number of possible solutions when selecting an LCS string. There exist efficient dynamic programming algorithms to count the exact number of LCS embeddings or LCS strings for a particular problem instance (see Appendix A for such algorithms). Each counting algorithm requires O(mn log E(m, n)) time and space. We use counting algorithms like these as the basis of our output sampling algorithms, later.
Typically, simple deterministic algorithms that "backtrack" through the LCS dynamic programming table are used to recover the string and/or embedding of an LCS for A and B.
In the next section we discuss new, strong privacy requirements for the selection mechanism that motivate the use of alternate methods for backtracking.
Our algorithms satisfying these stronger security requirements require the ability to efficiently sample from specific discrete distributions. Given a finite set of variables V = {v0, v1, . . . , v } and their frequencies {a0, a1, . . . , a }, a weighted coin toss selects a variable vi ∈ V with probability ai/b where b = P j∈[0, ] aj. There are many procedures for flipping a weighted coin. One very simple procedure is the following: select an appropriate number of random bits and let z be the integer they represent; if z > b, then we fail; else, we output vi where i is the smallest integer such that z ≤ P j∈ [0,i] aj. This procedure fails with probability (2 log b − 1)/2 log b < 1/2. The procedure uses gwct( , b) := O( log b) time and space. Additionally, notice that we can perform N weighted coin flips using kN log N log b random bits, where the probability of succeeding in all N coin flips is at least 1 − 1/2 k .
LCS AS A SEARCH PROBLEM
In this section, we define search problems, give two natural variants of the longest common subsequence problem formulated as search problems, and give some preliminary observations on their relationships.
Definition 3 (Privacy Structure [13]). A search problem is an ensemble
for some positive polynomial q(n). For a search problem P, the privacy structure ≡P is an equivalence relation on instances x, y ∈ {0,
Following Halevi et al. [27] and Beimel et al. [11] , we say that an algorithm leaks at most k bits if it refines each equivalence class by dividing it to at most 2 k sub-classes. Given two search problems P, R defined over the same input space, we call their privacy structures incomparable if neither is a strict refinement of the other. In other words, if ≡P refines ≡R and ≡R refines ≡P , then ≡P and ≡R are incomparable.
Definition 4 (LCS Embeddings). Define LCS-e as the search problem for LCS embeddings, where for all
A ∈ Σ m , B ∈ Σ n , we have LCS-e(A, B) = {(α, β) : LCSe(A, B, α, β)} Let
≡LCS-e be the related privacy structure, such that if LCS-e(A, B) = LCS-e(A , B ) we say (A, B) ≡LCS-e (A , B ). For example, (atg, aga) ≡LCS-e (agc, act).

Definition 5 (LCS Strings). Define LCS-s as the search problem for LCS strings, where for all
A ∈ Σ m , B ∈ Σ n ,
we have LCS-s(A, B) = {x : LCS(A, B, x)}
Let ≡LCS-s be the related privacy structure, such that if LCS-s(A, B) = LCS-s(A , B ) we say (A, B) ≡LCS-s (A , B ). For example, (atg, aga) ≡LCS-s (cag, atg).
A few observations follow immediately from these definitions. First, privacy structures for LCS-s and LCS-e are incomparable. Second, there are inputs of length n for which natural deterministic selection strategies leak Θ(n) bits with respect to these privacy structures. Together, these observations motivate us to look at these variants as separate and independent problems, and to search for clever nondeterministic strategies which provably protect their privacy structures. See Appendix B for details on these observations.
LCS OUTPUT SAMPLING
In this section, we give algorithms for our LCS variants which protect their respective privacy structures on a single query, known as output sampling algorithms. An output sampling algorithm is a randomized algorithm whose outputs (i) are correct answers to the search problem, and (ii) form a distribution which is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on answers to the search problem.
Definition 6 (Output Sampling [11, 13] ). Let P = {Pn} n∈N be a search problem. An algorithm A is called an output sampling algorithm for P if (i) A is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm taking two inputs x, sn where |x| = n and |sn| = p(n) for some polynomial p; and (ii) for every string x ∈ {0, 1} n the distribution A(x, sn) is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on P(x).
Our output sampling algorithms are based on efficient dynamic programming solutions for counting the number of outputs for each search problem. Below, we design an output sampling algorithm for the LCS-e search problem on inputs A and B. We use the LCS-e counting algorithm (see Appendix A) to compute the D matrix used by the algorithm. We assume that the L matrix is computed following the typical dynamic programming LCS algorithm.
With a few non-trivial modifications, the algorithm below can be transformed into an output sampling algorithm for the LCS-s search problem (see Appendix C).
Claim 2. Algorithm 1 is an output sampling algorithm for the LCS-e search problem and uses O(n log E(m, n)) time and O(|D|) space.
Proof. At each step of the backtracking algorithm, there are several options to choose from. In order to generate a uniformly random embedding, our algorithm needs to satisfy
if forceUp then sample z ∈ {1, 3} where
else if f orceLef t then sample z ∈ {1, 4} where
else sample z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} where
the following two properties. (i) At each step of the backtracking, every two possible backtracking options should lead to two disjoint sets of LCS embeddings. We call this the non-overlapping property. (ii) At each step, a backtracking option is chosen randomly, according to a distribution that is weighted proportional to the number of solutions that each option affords. We call this the correctly-weighted property.
We show that our algorithm has both of the above properties. Given that this is the case, based on a simple lemma which we introduce next, it is easy to see that our algorithm generates an LCS embedding uniformly at random.
Consider a tree T rooted at node r. The following simple algorithm shows how to traverse the tree and output one leaf of the tree uniformly at random.
End if StartNode does not have any children.
Otherwise, randomly choose one of StartNode's children, according to the distribution that is weighted by the number of that child's desendents.
3. Let StartNode be equal to the chosen child. Go back to the first step.
Lemma 1. Consider a tree T rooted at node r. The algorithm given above outputs a leaf of the tree uniformly at random.
In our algorithm each pair (i, j) corresponds to an internal node in the tree, and each LCS embedding between strings A and B corresponds to a leaf. In each iteration of the while Furthermore, the number of embeddings for each of the above four backtracking options is computed and stored in W1, . . . , W4, respectively. The Wi values are used to create the distribution for each coin toss and therefore satisfy the second property. This concludes the correctness argument.
The main loop iterates at most m + n times. In each iteration we perform a single weighted coin toss, requiring gwct(4, E(n, m)) = O(log E(n, m)) time and space. Thus, the algorithm uses
Output sampling algorithms may be appropriate for some applications and useful as independent constructions. Notice, however, that multiple queries to an output sampling algorithm allow one to learn many outputs, possibly. Next, we design algorithms which meet a stronger notion of privacy, respecting the privacy structure while restricting what is learned across multiple queries.
LCS EQUIVALENCE PROTECTING
In this section, we give algorithms for our LCS variants which protect their respective privacy structures across multiple queries, known as equivalence protecting algorithms. An equivalence protecting algorithm cannot be efficiently distinguished from a randomly selected oracle that (i) provides correct answers to the search problem, and (ii) gives the same output for all inputs in the same equivalence class with respect to the problem's privacy structure.
Definition 7 (Equivalence Protecting [13] 
where the first probability is over the uniform distribution over oracles On that are private with respect to P, and the second probability is uniform over the choices of the seed sn for the algorithm A.
In summary, an equivalence protecting algorithm provides solutions that look random and behaves consistently on equiv-alent inputs (and therefore does not leak further information when executed repeatedly on equivalent inputs).
Equivalence Protecting: LCS Embedding
In this section, we design an equivalence protecting algorithm for the LCS-e search problem. We do so by first building a canonical representative algorithm for P. Briefly, a canonical representative algorithm is a randomized algorithm which, for all inputs in the same equivalence class, gives some "canonical" output, which itself is a member of the equivalence class.
Definition 8 (Canonical Representative [13] 
We then make use of a generic construction, due to Beimel et al. [13] , which reduces the problem of designing an equivalence protecting algorithm for P to that of designing an output sampling algorithm and canonical representative algorithm for P.
Theorem 2 (Generic Construction [13] We refer the reader to Beimel et al. [13] for details on the construction. At a high level, however, the construction proceeds as follows: on input x, use the canonical representative algorithm to generate an instance xrep; run the output sampling algorithm on xrep using a source of randomness that is deterministically based on xrep, i.e. let the algorithm's seed be Fn(xrep). 
Algorithm 2 Canonical representative algorithm for LCS
-e 1. for j ← n to 0, i ← m to 0 do 2. rep (A,B) ← ∅ 3. if i = m or j = n 4. then Reach[i, j] ← T rue 5. else 6. Reach[i, j] ← F alse 7. if L[i, j] = L[i + 1, j + 1] − 1 and A[i + 1] = B[j + 1] 8. then Reach[i, j] ← T rue 9. else if L[i, j] = L[i + 1, j] and Reach[i + 1, j] 10. then Reach[i, j] ← T rue 11. else if L[i, j] = L[i,
return (C, D)
Claim 3. There exists an equivalence protecting algorithm for the LCS-e search problem, using O(mn + n log E(m, n)) time and O(|D|) space.
The construction automatically follows from Theorem 2, our output sampling algorithm (Algorithm 1), and our canonical representative algorithm (Algorithm 2), described next.
One straight-forward strategy for computing (C, D) given the set rep (A,B) (i.e., for Algorithm 2, Step 16) is provided in Algorithm 3. Without loss of generality we assume that |Σ| ≥ n. If this is not the case, we can simply add dummy characters to the alphabet to satisfy this requirement. Let σ k denote the lexicographically k-th character in the alphabet.
Algorithm 3
Remove (i, j) from rep (A,B) 10. end while 11. for all i ≤ m 12.
if
. Algorithm 2 is a canonical representative algorithm for the LCS-e search problem and uses O(mn) time and space. For this algorithm, we assume that entries of the L matrix are computed using the normal dynamic programming LCS algorithm.
At a high level, the algorithm works by collecting any . This collects all the "important" structure of A and B. In the proof, we show that any two inputs are in the same equivalence class if and only if the algorithm generates the same rep set for them. Using the rep set, we deterministically output a pair of strings (C, D) such that rep (C,D) = rep. Thus, for any two equivalent inputs, the algorithm generates the same rep set and outputs the same string (C, D), which is itself a member of the equivalence class.
Proof. Denote Algorithm 2 by A. We show that for any pair of inputs (A, B), (A , B ), we have (A, B) ≡LCS-e (A , B ) iff A(A, B) = A(A , B
). This will suffice to show that A is a canonical representative algorithm for the LCS-e search problem. , j) ∈ rep (A ,B ) . This shows that rep (A,B) = rep (A ,B ) . Because our choice of string is deterministic and based on rep (A,B) , this shows A (A, B) = A(A , B ) .
Second, we show the reverse direction. Let (C, D) = A (A, B) . Recall (C, D) was chosen by the algorithm so that rep (C,D) = rep (A,B) . Following from our assumption that A (A, B) = A(A , B ) , we now have that rep (A,B) = rep (C,D) = rep (A ,B ) . We prove our claim by showing that, under this assumption, any LCS embedding for (A, B) is an LCS embedding for (A , B ) and vice versa. Consider an arbitrary embedding (α, β) corresponding to an LCS of length for (A, B) . The embedding (α, β) corresponds to a sequence of pairs (i1, j1), . . . , (i , j ) in rep (A,B) that is monotonically increasing, i.e. for any (i k , j k ) in the sequence we have i k < i k+1 and j k < j k +1 . This sequence of pairs also exists in rep (A ,B ) , since rep (A,B) = rep (A ,B ) . By our construction for the set rep (A ,B ) , this means (α, β) is an embedding of a common subsequence for (A , B ) . We now need to show that this common subsequence is of maximal length and therefore is an LCS for (A , B ) . It suffices to argue that no monotonically increasing sequence of length > in rep (A ,B ) exists. If this were true, any such sequence would correspond to a common subsequence of length > for (A, B) too, and would contradict our assumption that (α, β) was an embedding of an LCS of length for (A, B). Therefore, (α, β) is also an LCS embedding for (A , B ). Symmetrically, one can show that any LCS embedding for (A , B ) is also an LCS embedding for (A, B) .
This concludes our claim that (A, B) ≡LCS-e (A , B ).
The main loop of A iterates mn times. In each iteration, the set rep (A,B) increases by at most one. Thus, the algorithm uses |L| + mn = O(mn) space and O(mn) time.
Equivalence Protecting: LCS String
Here, we design an equivalence protecting algorithm for the LCS-s search problem. Unlike before, we do not build a canonical representative algorithm for the LCS-s search problem. Instead, we take advantage of the fact that LCS-s(A, B) is a finite language (and therefore regular) and we construct an efficient acyclic deterministic finite automaton (DFA) whose language is precisely LCS-s (A, B) . Essentially, we reduce the problem to that of finding an equivalence protecting algorithm for words in the language of an acyclic DFA. We give our equivalence protecting algorithm for words in the language of an acyclic DFA in Section 5.3. Our reduction works because the solution space is not distorted by the transformation; it is efficient because the DFA we produce is small. 
is an equivalence protecting algorithm for the LCS-s search problem, running in O(nm + n log E(n, m)) time and space (for alphabets of fixed size) or O(n 2 log E(n, m)) time and space (for unbounded alphabets).
Proof. The ability to use input (A, B) to efficiently construct an acyclic DFA MAB where L(MAB) = LCS-s(A, B) follows from Claim 6.
If inputs (A, B), (A , B ) are in the same equivalence class with respect to the privacy structure for LCS-s, then MAB and M A B are in the same equivalence class with respect to the privacy structure for the language of a DFA. This follows immediately from the fact that w ∈ L(MAB) iff w ∈ LCS-s(A, B) . Thus, an equivalence protecting algorithm for the language of acyclic DFAs on input MAB is an equivalence protecting algorithm for LCS-s on input (A, B) . The existence of an equivalence protecting algorithm for the language of an acyclic DFA follows from Claim 9.
The efficiency of Algorithm 4 follows from the efficiency of Claim 6, from the efficiency of Claim 9, and from the fact that
|L(MAB)| = |LCS-s(A, B)| ≤ E(n, m).
The transformation we use in Step 1 of Algorithm 4 to convert input (A, B) into a DFA is similar to the algorithm of Baeza-Yates [10] used to solve the LCS problem. This algorithm builds a directed acyclic subsequence graph [19] (DASG) for strings A and B. A DASG for a string A is a DFA that accepts the language of all subsequences in A (for an example, see Figure 1) .
A DASG is analogous to a directed acyclic word graph (DAWG), but while a DAWG recognizes all possible O(n 2 ) subwords of A using O(n) space, a DASG recognizes all possible 2 n subsequences of A using O(n) space. We do not require our DFA to be this space-efficient (in particular, the canonical representative algorithm for finite regular languages we use will not preserve this space efficiency) and instead use a variation of Baeza-Yates' construction to build a DASG for A and B using O(nm) time and O(n 2 ) space. A, B, w) }. The pruning procedure takes time and space linear in the size of M AB , and is described in-depth in the full version of this paper [24] .
Equivalence Protecting: Finite Languages
Here, we design an equivalence protecting algorithm for words in the language of an acyclic DFA. We use the following notation. A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) M = (S, Σ, T, s0, A) is a 5-tuple where: S is a set of states; Σ is a finite alphabet; s0 is the initial state; A ⊆ S is the set of accepting states; T : S × Σ → S is a function defining the transitions of the automata. Given any DFA M = The DASG for input "acgtat" (above) and "cgatta" (below).
A DFA is acyclic if its graph is acyclic. First, we define the privacy structure for the finite language search problem. Note that while any finite language can be represented by an acyclic DFA, the size of the DFA may not be small. Our algorithms are efficient for languages whose acyclic DFA representations are small. As we have shown, this is the case for the language LCS-s. Proof. An acyclic DFA M can be used to produce the minimal-state DFA Mrep in O(|Σ||S|) time [35] . The resulting DFA will necessarily also be acyclic. Mrep is a canonical representative algorithm for the Lang search problem because any two DFAs M, M accepting the same language will produce the same DFA Mrep when minimized. This follows from the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem on the uniqueness (up to isomorphism) of the minimal-state DFA accepting the language L(M ). The algorithm for this claim is given in Algorithm 5. As before, we prove the claim by showing the algorithm has the non-overlapping and correctly-weighted properties. Unlike before, the algorithm and proof are much simpler, due to the fact that every path through the graph corresponds to a unique output (else, we reach a contradiction with the DFA being minimal). R ← ∅ 8.
for
if s ∈ A then R ← s ∪ R and ts ← 1 end if 11.
t ← P i∈R ti 12.
sample z ∈ R where P r[z
return ans 15. else 16.
choose a random transition of the form (s, σ, z) ∈ T 17.
ans ← ans||σ 18.
s ← z 19.
end if 20. end loop Proof. We prove the claim by showing Algorithm 5 has the non-overlapping and correctly-weighted properties.
In the algorithm, the labeling procedure is straight-forward since the automaton is finite and acyclic. At the end of the labeling procedure, the variable strings(s) represents the number of paths from s to some accepting state, because every transition leads to a state that is within the reach of an accepting state (M does not have any non-accepting states with no outgoing transitions, since these "dead states" could be removed thus contradicting the minimality of M ). Each path from from s to some accepting state corresponds to a unique string, because each transition out of s is labeled with a unique character (recall, M is a DFA). Thus the algorithm has the non-overlapping property.
In the algorithm, for i = s, ti is the number of strings that can be produced moving to state i. When s is an accepting state then we can consider returning the current string by letting ts = 1. Otherwise, ti is the number of strings produced along paths from s to some accepting state along a path passing through state i. If we select i = s, then we select a random transition to move to state i. Thus, the algorithm has the correctly-weighted property.
Note that the values strings(s) and ti are never larger than the size of the language |L(M )|. Thus, the length of the labels and the length of the numbers used for the weighted coin This follows immediately from the generic construction of Theorem 2, the existence of an efficient canonical representative algorithm for this search problem (Claim 7), and the existence of an efficient output sampling algorithm for this search problem (Claim 8).
CONCLUSION
We have introduced variants of the longest common subsequence problem, a classic problem for both computer scientists and biologists, and considered each as a private search problem. For each we defined a strong security requirement and explored the definitions and the relationships of these privacy structures. We presented efficient private search algorithms for each variant and for the search problem of words in the language of a DFA, which may be of independent interest. The time and space required by each of our algorithms is asymptotically the same as (or better than) that of the algorithms used to count the size of the problem's output set on a given input. All our algorithms can be securely implemented in a variety of client-server or distributed settings using existing, general secure multiparty computation protocols, e.g. [14, 18, 23, 43] .
Generating uniformly random solutions to problems is a very natural notion and, as such, a large body of research has been devoted to designing polynomial-time output sampling algorithms for a variety of combinatorial problems, such as perfect bipartite matchings [28] and spanning trees [16] (for some survey work and more examples, see [22, 29, 38] ). Further complementing this line of research, we hope our work may motivate more efficient sampling algorithms for our problems, perhaps by relaxing our objectives and sampling from the solution space computationally close to uniform, or perhaps by finding more efficient counting algorithms (on which our sampling algorithms rely).
In addition to the definitions considered in this paper, Beimel et al. [13] , propose an alternative notion for private search algorithms, called resemblance preserving algorithms. We leave it as an open problem to design efficient resemblance preserving algorithms for the LCS-e and the LCS-s problems.
While the literature on private genomic computation is itself still evolving, we hope our work motivates further research in this area: research on the relationship between the strong definitions of privacy presented here and the types of privacy being considered in biomedical research; research on bounding the expected value of E(n, m) for realistic genomic data; and research on other private search problems of interest to genomic research.
(A, B) ≡LCS-s (A , B ) and (A, B) ≡LCS-e (A , B )
Now, consider any deterministic selection strategy f lcs that recovers a longest common sequence string. Of the longest common subsequences, it must return one. Each unique LCS embedded in input A corresponds to a unique string. Without loss of generality, say the deterministic algorithm f lcs (A, B) returns the LCS with the "earliest" embedding in A. For example, our strategy yields f lcs (abc, cba) = a while f lcs (bca, acb) = b.
Thus, {f lcs (A, B) : (A, B) ∈ S} is a set of size 2 . Therefore, f lcs partitions the equivalence class into 2 sub-classes. Thus, this deterministic backtracking algorithm leaks = Θ(n) bits relative to ≡LCS-s.
To show the same result for embeddings, let f lcs (A, B) be the deterministic selection strategy that returns the embedding of a longest common subsequence. Consider the strategy that, at each step, chooses the lexicographically first character. For example, f lcs (gcta, cagt) returns the embedding of ca. Again, the set {f lcs (A, B) : (A, B) ∈ S} contains 2 unique embeddings (all embed the string adgj . . .), thus dividing the equivalence class into 2 sub-classes. As one might expect, ≡LCS-es refines both ≡LCS-s and ≡LCS-e. In fact, as we show next, the structure ≡LCS-es leaks Θ(n) bits relative to both ≡LCS-s and ≡LCS-e. Claim 13. Privacy structure ≡LCS-es leaks Θ(n) bits relative to privacy structure ≡LCS-s.
Definition 10 (Embeddings with Strings
Proof. It it clear that ≡LCS-es refines ≡LCS-s. Consider the set S from before. For (A, B), (A , B ) Permuting the alphabet will not change the embeddings (the strings are, structurally, the same as before), but it will change the values of the strings at those embeddings. When |Σ| = n = 3 , this divides ≡LCS-e into`n ´s ub-classes. Since (3e) ≤`n ´≤ 3 , ≡LCS-es leaks Θ(n) bits relative to ≡LCS-e.
C. OUTPUT SAMPLING: LCS STRING
Our output sampling algorithm for the LCS-e search problem can be modified using the appropriate variant of the counting algorithm in Algorithm 6, to yield an output sampling algorithm for the LCS-s search problem. The following claim summarizes the complexities of this algorithm. For completeness, both versions of these algorithms are presented in the full version of this paper [24] . Proof. The efficiency claim follows the proof of Claim 2, due to the closeness in operation of the two variants. The correctness claim is proven in the full version of this paper, but the argument follows that of Claim 2, with minor differences stemming from the new, underlying counting algorithm.
